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Abstract 
Survey and option data are used to take a fresh look at the equity premium puzzle. Survey 
data on equity returns (Livingston survey) shows much lower expected excess returns than 
ex post data. At the same time, option data suggests that investors perhaps overestimate the 
volatility of equity returns. Both facts reduce the puzzle. However, data on beliefs about 
output volatility (Survey of Professional Forecasters) shows marked overconfidence. On 
balance, the equity premium is somewhat less of a puzzle than in ex post data. 
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JEL Classification 
G12, E130, E320 1 Introduction
This paper studies if the consumption based asset pricing model is compatible with survey
data on subjective beliefs.
Asset pricing models are statements about how expected returns are related to the per-
ceived risk exposure of different assets. This is seldom tested directly. Instead, the models
are typically assessed by comparing theoretical pricing implications with the properties
of historical (ex post) data. The results can therefore only be given a clear interpretation
under the maintained hypothesis that the historical sample is a good representation of
subjective beliefs. For instance, the ﬁnding of an “equity premium puzzle” relies on the
assumption that investors have really expected an excess return of 6%–8% on U.S. equity.
There are several reasons to believe that the moments of historical data can be quite
poor approximations of investors’ expectations. Early empirical evidence from survey
data suggests that expected returns may deviate from historical averages (for instance,
Lakonishok, 1980) and more recent evidence suggests that investors may underestimate
the uncertainty of risk (for instance, Thaler, 2000, and Giordani and S¨ oderlind, 2003).
These ﬁndings could be driven by either small sample problems or some sort of distorted
expectations.
Thesmall sampleproblemsarequite likely, sinceequity returnsarehighlyvolatile and
sometimes exposed to unusually large shocks. It can easily happen that a fairly long sam-
ple has sample moments that deviate substantially from the true values (and subjective,
ex ante, beliefs).
Even in the absence of small sample problems, historical data may be poorly suited
for testing asset pricing models. Recent ﬁndings in behavioural economics (for instance,
Hirshleifer (2001)) often point to overconﬁdence among economic agents. Research on
learning (for instance, Lewellen and Shanken, 2002) and on robust decision making (for
instance, Tornell, 2000, and Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent, 2003) emphasise that there
may be good theoretical reasons for why ex ante beliefs deviate systematically from ex
post data.
The approach in this paper is to evaluate the consumption based asset pricing model
by using survey data on expected returns and the volatility of the risk factors. This cir-
cumvents the problems with expectation errors—and is therefore a way to test the model
more directly.
3Togetareasonablylongsamplewithhigh-qualitydata, Icombineseveraldatasources.
The Livingston survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters are used to measure
subjective beliefs of expected equity returns and consumption volatility. Both surveys are
focused on the beliefs of economists close to the ﬁnancial markets and are administered
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Implied volatilities from options on the
S&P 500 index are used as a measure of equity return uncertainty.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the standard consumption
based asset pricing model. Sections 3 and 3.4 present the survey data and the empirical
results. Section 5 sums up. The appendix gives details on data.
2 The Standard Consumption Based Asset Pricing Model
This section gives a brief summary of the standard CRRA model and the equity premium
puzzle.
The standard consumption based asset pricing model assumes a utility function with
constant relative risk aversion, C
1−γ
t /(1 − γ), where Ct is consumption and γ the risk
aversion coefﬁcient. The Euler equation for optimal portfolio choice can be written as
E[Re
t (Ct/Ct−1)−γ] = 0, where Re
t is the excess return on an asset—and E() denotes the
expectations of the (representative) investor.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the investor thinks that the excess return and
consumptiongrowthhaveabivariatenormaldistribution. UseStein’slemma1 torearrange
the Euler equation as
E(Re





where 1ct is the growth rate of consumption, ln(Ct/Ct−1). It is worth emphasising
that this equation is part of the investor’s decision process—and therefore holds only
for his/her beliefs. It really does not matter where those beliefs come from, if they are
rational, or if they are the result of a learning process (as in, for instance, Brennan (1998)).
We can relax the assumption that the excess return is normally distributed: (2) holds
also if Re
t and 1ct have a bivariate mixture normal distribution—provided 1ct has the
1Stein’s lemma says that if x and y have a bivariate normal distribution and h(y) is a differentiable
function such that E[|h0(y)|] < ∞, then Cov[x,h(y)] = Cov(x, y)E[h0(y)]. See Cochrane (2001).
4same mean and variance in all the mixture components (see S¨ oderlind (2006)). This
restricts consumption growth to have a normal distribution, but allows the excess return
to have a distribution with fat tails and skewness.
The gain from assuming a normal distribution of consumption growth (using Stein’s
lemma) is that the unknown coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, γ, enters multiplicatively
in (1)–(2). This allows us to work with correlations and standard deviations of returns
and consumption growth—for which it might be possible to ﬁnd survey data. In con-
trast, if we did not assume normally distributed consumption growth rates, then we would
need information about, for instance, the standard deviation of (Ct/Ct−1)−γ. There is no
survey data on such things.2
The equity premium puzzle (see Mehra and Prescott (1985)) is that (2) does not hold
for ex post data unless γ is very high. To illustrate this, I use quarterly US data for
1952Q3–2005Q4. Consumption growth is measured as the growth rate of per capita con-
sumption of nondurables and services (see Appendix A) and the return is the real return
on the S&P 500 in excess of the real return on a 3-month T-bill rate.
In annualised terms (quarterly growth rates are multiplied by 4 and quarterly standard













σ(1ct) | {z }
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γ. (3)
Two numbers are given for the correlation: the lower is when consumption growth (a ﬂow
variable) is measured as the growth between the current and lagged quarter; the higher
when it is measured as the growth between the next and current quarters. In any case,
even if the correlation was perfect (one), then we need a relative risk aversion, γ, of 43 to
make (3) hold. This is the puzzle.
3 Evidence from Survey Data
The survey and option data used in this paper come from different sources, cover different
periods, and have different sampling frequencies. There really are not many alternatives,
at least not if we want to work with reasonably long samples.
2The general expression is E(Re
t ) = −Cov[Re
t ,(Ct/Ct−1)−γ]/E[(Ct/Ct−1)−γ]; the covariance can be
expanded in terms of the correlation and the two standard deviations.
53.1 Relation Between Survey Data and the Asset Pricing Equation
Survey data gives information on conditional moments of subjective beliefs of heteroge-
neous agents. In contrast, the asset pricing equation (3) is expressed in terms of uncon-
ditional moments of a representative investor. This section discusses how the survey data
may still be useful to understand the properties of the asset pricing equation.
The evidence from surveys and options is on conditional moments—both data sets
essentially contain answers to a question like “based on your information today, what do
you believe about x in the near future?” We therefore need a rule for transforming back
to unconditional moments. This is straightforward for the expected return, E(Re
t ), since
the unconditional expectation is best estimated by the average conditional expectation (by
the law of iterated expectations). For the standard deviations in (3), matters are slightly
more complicated. But, if the excess returns and the consumption growth rates are unpre-
dictable (which is a good approximation), then the unconditional variance is the average
conditional variance. The unconditional standard deviation is then the square root of the
average conditional variance—which is the approach used below.
The Euler equation (2) is valid for each investor—provided we are careful enough to
use the moments of his/her beliefs about the return and his/her own consumption. In (3)
it is further assumed that all investors are identical: they share the same beliefs and it is
aggregate consumption that matters.
The survey data has a different structure: it asks for his/her beliefs about the return
and aggregate output. To bridge the gap between data and the asset pricing equation, we
need strong assumptions. First, that results on over/underestimation of the volatility of
output(whichwehavedataon)carriesovertoconsumption(whichenterstheassetpricing
equation). Second, that equity premia are not affected by non-insurable idiosyncratic risk
(since we have no information on this risk). Third, that aggregation of beliefs (since the
respondents in the survey disagree) is unimportant.
None of these assumptions is likely to hold exactly, but they may well be reasonable
approximations. First, the time series properties of output and consumption are very sim-
ilar in many respects: they are strongly correlated over all horizons and so are the forecast
errors. In addition, most macroeconomic theory would suggest a very strong link. Sec-
ond, the evidence on (the importance for asset pricing of) idiosyncratic risk is mixed
(see, for instance, Lettau (2002) and Cogley (1998)). Third, aggregation of heterogenous
beliefs may well suggest that an average belief is a good approximation of the represen-
6tative investor’s belief—in particular when the relative risk aversion is high. For instance,
Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2005) show (by extending a model by Varian (1985)) that a rep-
resentative investor should be assigned a mean equal to the cross-sectional mean, and a
variance equal to a combination of the (cross sectional average of) individual uncertainty
and the cross-sectional disagreement. It turns out that the relative weight on disagreement
is 1/(γ + 1): with log utility disagreement is as important as individual uncertainty (this
is the case in Rubinstein (1974) and Detemple and Murthy (1994)), but a more realistic
value of the relative risk aversion gives a very small role to disagreement. This suggests
that it might be reasonable to disregard the aggregation issue.
3.2 Expected Stock Return
The Livingston survey summarizes the forecasts of economists in industry, government,
banking, and academia. It is the oldest continuous survey of economists’ forecasts, started
in 1946 by the ﬁnancial columnist Joseph Livingston. It was taken over by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in 1990. It contains questions about the expected Standard
& Poor (S&P) index level 6 and 12 months ahead in time.
For the period June 1952 to June 1990, the Livingston survey asked for the S&P In-
dustrials index (labelled S&P’s 425 Industrials for most of period, but is different from
the more recent S&P 400 Midcap).3 From December 1990 and onwards the survey has
asked for the S&P 500 Composite. For further details and references, see Lakonishok
(1980), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2005), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia (2004) and Appendix A.
The June and December surveys are sent out in late May and November respectively.
The June survey asks for the index levels at the end of December the same year and June
next year. Similarly, the December survey asks for the index levels at the end of June and
December next year.
It is, however, somewhat unclear what base value to use in order to calculate expected
capital gains (growth rates). There are two main alternatives in the literature. First, the
survey contained base values—typically from the middle of the month before the sur-
vey. This gives investment horizons of 7.5 and 13.5 months respectively. Second, Pearce
3The June 1952 survey asked about the S&P 365 Industrials, the December 1952 to December 1956
asked about the S&P 420 Industrials. These indices had 1935–39=100 as base. For June 1957 to June 1990
the survey asked about the S&P (425) Industrials, with 1941–43=10 as base.
7(1984) use base value from the last day of month before the survey: which gives invest-
ment horizons of 7 and 13 months. There are issues with both: some of the base values
seem unreliable and it is not entirely clear that the respondents had access to the end-of-
month values (of the right index) when ﬁlling out the forms. I will mostly focus on a
third alternative where I combine the 6- and 12-month forecasts to calculate an implied
expected growth rate over a 6-month horizon starting 6 months from now. This avoids the
problems with the base level and the investment horizon is undoubtedly 6 months. (None
of the conclusions are affected by this choice.)
Table 1 shows the (annualised) results for the 6-month horizon starting 6 months from
now for the sample June 1952 to December 2005. It shows the average capital gains
in excess of a riskfree rate (approximated by a 3-month T-bill rate) as forecasted by the
survey and in ex post data. The ex post returns are for precisely the same periods as the
survey contains forecasts of, so the results are comparable.
1952–1990 1990–2005 1952–2005
Survey expectations (capital gain) −1.1 1.5 −0.4
S&P Industrials, ex post (capital gain) 3.2
S&P 500, ex post (capital gain) 5.3
S&P combined, ex post (capital gain) 3.8
Dividend yield S&P 500 4.0 2.1 3.5
Table 1: Average capital gains in excess of a riskfree rate, dividend yield, annualised %. The
table shows results for the 6-month horizon starting 6 months ahead in time, annualised by multiplying by
2. The survey data are from the Livingston survey and show the expected change of the stock index (S&P
Industrials for 1952:6–1990:6 and S&P 500 Composite for 1990:12–2005:12) — in excess of a riskfree
rate. The survey data is based on the cross-sectional median forecast in each period. The ex post results
are for the corresponding actual changes in the stock index. The S&P combined uses S&P Industrials for
1952:1–1990:6 and S&P 500 Composite for 1990:12–2005:12.
For the early sample (1952–1990) the Livingston survey has an expected capital gain
(in excess of a riskfree rate) of −1.1% (annualised), while the ex post capital gain on the
S&P Industrials was 3.2%. For the late sample (1990–2005), the survey has an expected
capital gain of 1.5% while the ex post capital gain on the S&P 500 was 5.3% (both in
excess of the riskfree rate).
Clearly, thecapitalgainontheindicesisnotthetotalreturnfrominvestingonthestock
market. Table 1 therefore also gives the ex post dividend yield on the S&P 500 index,
which is around 4.0% and 2.1% for the early and late samples respectively. The survey
8contains no information about expected dividends, but it seems reasonable to assume that
there is no bias in the 12-month dividend forecasts—especially since dividends are fairly
smooth over time. It also seems reasonable to use the dividend yield for the S&P 500
index for both sub samples (the S&P Industrials and 500 indices are very similar). In that
case, the expected excess returns were 2.9% and 3.6% for the two samples.4 In contrast,
the ex post excess returns were around 7.2%−7.4%. This suggests that, over the last half
century, ex post returns on U.S. equities have been substantially higher than expected (in
the Livingston survey). This squares well with the notion of the U.S. market as one of the
“lucky cases” (see, for instance, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995)), or with the idea
of too pessimistic investors (see Abel (2002)).














Survey + ex post dividend yield
Figure 1: Expected capital gains on the S&P index in excess of a riskfree rate, annualised %.
This ﬁgure shows the expected capital gains (in excess of a riskfree rate) for the 6-month horizon starting
6 months ahead in time (with and without adding the ex post dividend yield) and the NBER recessions
(shaded areas). The data is for the S&P Industrials for the period up to June 1990, and the S&P 500 after
that.
This evidence comes from a small sample of forecasters, so we cannot really tell if the
results are representative of the market expectations or not. Studying the properties of the
forecasts is one (informal) way of assessing the evidence.
4The Survey of Professional Forecasters also asks for the expected 10-year S&P 500 return as well as
the average 3-month T-bill rate. For the 1992–2006 sample the implied expected excess return is 3.9%.













Figure 2: Expected and ex post capital gains on the S&P index in excess of a riskfree rate,
annualised %. This ﬁgure shows the 6-month ex post capital gains (in excess of a riskfree rate) and the
forecast of it made 1 year earlier. The data is for the S&P Industrials for the period up to June 1990, and
the S&P 500 after that.
The implied average expectation error is around 3% (annualised) for the combined
sample—which is large. However, the standard deviation of the expectation errors is
around 16% and the sample has just a bit more than 100 observations, so a standard test
of the null hypothesis of no (average) expectation errors is borderline signiﬁcant (a t-stat
of 3/(16/
√
100) = 1.9). The volatile stock market returns makes learning hard, even in a
sample of more than 50 years.
To assess the time pattern of the expectations and the expectation errors, consider Fig-
ure 1. The upper panel shows the implied expected capital gains in excess of a riskfree
rate for months 6 to 12—with and without adding the ex post dividend yield. The NBER
recessions are marked by shaded areas. The Livingston forecasters clearly did not be-
lieve in the random walk hypothesis: there are distinct movements in the expected capital
gains. In particular, the expectations have (local) maxima in almost all recessions. In
contrast, the expectations for the next 6 months (not shown), have local minima in most
recessions. This suggests a belief in short term momentum, but a medium term mean
reversion. Indeed, the correlation between current ex post capital gains (over the last 6
months) and the expected gains over the next 6 months is positive (0.13 for the combined
10sample), while the correlation with the expected gains over months 6 to 12 is negative
(-0.17). In any case, the forecasting performance is poor. Apart the (already documented)
average underprediction, the forecasters have virtually zero R-squares in trying to predict
the movements around the mean.
Figure 1 also shows the expected values plus the ex post dividend yield—in an attempt
to illustrate the time proﬁle of expected returns. This curve is, more or less, a vertical shift
of the expected capital gains—although the shift is larger in the early part of the sample.
There are still a number of periods with negative expected returns, which are somewhat
unappealing. Clearly, if this represents the market returns, and we assume a text book
mean-variance setting, then a risk averse representative investor cannot have negative
expected returns. On the other hand, in a consumption-based model nothing rules out
negative risk premia. For instance, Duffee (2005) estimates a time-varying covariance
of consumption growth and the CRSP stock market returns and ﬁnds negative values of
many periods, for instance, in the early 1960s and 1980s (compare with Figure 1). If we
instead take the position of Campbell and Thompson (2005) that negative expected excess
returns should be replaced by zeros, then the ex post returns would still be 1.5% higher
than the survey data. This half of the previous difference, but still a sizeable ﬁgure.
Figure 2 compares the expectations with the ex post capital gains. The ﬁgure sug-
gests that the differences in average capital gains may well be driven by a few exceptional
periods. For instance, there were prolonged periods of consistent under estimation in
1954–1955 (when the market value grew by almost 70%) and 1995–1999 (when the mar-
ket value trebled). Although there are a few periods of consistent over prediction (mainly
2001–2002), they tend to be less dramatic. All other periods appear more like random
noise, where short-lived under and over predictions more or less cancel.
While the post-Korean-war and dot-com booms are deﬁning periods in U.S. stock
market history, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that they may well have been
mostly unexpected. If so, the survey data on stock market expectations tells a very differ-
ent story about average returns than ex post data.
In the end, this evidence suggests that the expected excess return might be around
3.0%–3.5%. This is about half of the historical average. This will, in itself, reduce the
required risk aversion (γ) in asset pricing equation (2) by half.
113.3 Consumption Growth Volatility
Most surveys ask the respondents to supply their point forecasts—but very few ask for
measures of uncertainty. The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is an exception,
since it asks for histograms of the respondents’ subjective probability distribution of real
GDP growth.5 I will use this information to compare the subjective uncertainty to actual
uncertainty (the volatility of forecast errors). Although this provides evidence only on
output growth volatility, it is plausible that the results (in relative terms) carry over to
consumption growth.
The idea of the SPF is to ask professional forecasters about their views on key macroe-
conomic and ﬁnancial variables. The survey dates back to the late 1960s, but the question
about the subjective probability distribution was introduced only in 1981Q3. The survey
is now administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (before 1990, by Victor
Zarnowitz and others of the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of
Economic Research).
ToelicitsubjectiveprobabilitydistributionofrealGDPgrowththerespondentisasked
to assign probabilities of different growth intervals (bins) deﬁned by the survey manager.
For instance, for growth rates between 0% and 0.9%, between 1% and 1.9%, and so on.6
The growth rates are deﬁned as year-on-year (the value in calendar year t divided by
the value in calendar year t − 1, minus one). I use forecasts of this growth rate at four
forecasting horizons: one to four quarters ahead. The four-quarter forecast is made in Q1
of year t, the three-quarter forecast is made in Q2 and so forth.
The survey is sent out towards the end of the ﬁrst month of the quarter and the replies
are due around two weeks later. This makes the deﬁnition of the forecasting horizon a
moot point. Unlike ﬁnancial data, GDP data is published with a considerable lag (and
later revised). For instance, it can be argued that the four-quarter survey (with replies due
around 15 February) is anything between a 12-month forecast to a 10.5-month forecast.
I will use the former convention, but that will not affect the results on the relative under-
/overestimation of volatility since I combine the information in the subjective distribution
and the point forecasts reported at the same time (see below).
5To be precise, real GNP during 1981Q3–1991Q4 and real GDP since 1992Q1.
6Before 1992, the bins were as follows: less than -2, -2 to -0.1, 0 to 1.9, 2 to 3.9, 4 to 5.9, and 6 and
above. Since 1992, they are: less than -2, -2 to -1.1, 1 to -0.1, 0 to 0.9, 1 to 1.9 , 2 to 2.9, 3 to 3.9, 4 to 4.9,
5 to 5.9, and 6 and above.
12Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003) and Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2005) discuss how to
estimate the underlying distribution from a histogram reported by a forecaster. They ﬁnd
that ﬁtting a normal distribution to each histogram typically works well. Therefore, for
each forecaster/forecasting horizon/survey period, I ﬁt a normal distribution to his/her
histogram by minimizing the sum of squared errors (implied probability of a bin minus
theactualprobabilityaccordingtothehistogram). Theﬁttednormaldistributionisthenan
estimate of the forecaster’s subjective distribution. This produces a subjective variance for
every forecaster in every period (that he/she participated in the survey). I then calculate a
cross-sectional“consensus”varianceforeachperiodbytakingthecross-sectionalmedian,
and then form a time-average. (Using the cross-sectional means produce a similar time-
average.)
For the “ex post volatility” we need a conditional variance, that is, the variance of the
forecast errors. I estimate this by using the consensus (cross-sectional median) forecasts
as the point forecasts.
4 quarters 3 quarters 2 quarters 1 quarter
Survey 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4
Ex post 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8
Table 2: Standard deviation of year-on-year output growth, %. The table shows results for four
different forecasting horizons. The survey data are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and covers
the period 1982Q1 to 2005Q4. The survey standard deviation is calculated as the square root of the time
average of the consensus variance. The consensus variance for a given period is calculated as the cross-
sectional (different forecasters) median variance. The ex post standard deviation is for the forecast errors,
using the consensus point forecast.
Table 2 reports results for all four horizons.7 For instance, the ex post standard devi-
ation for the 2-quarter horizon is 0.8%, while the standard deviation from the subjective
distributions is only 0.5%. This difference is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (based on a delta
methodapproach). Theotherhorizonsgivesimilarresults. Thissuggeststhattheforecast-
ers have underestimated uncertainty considerably: the ratio of the ex post and subjective
standard deviations varies between 1/2 (at the 1-quarter horizon) to 3/4 (at the 3-quarter
horizon). Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2005) reach a similar conclusion by using somewhat
different methods (the coverage ratio of subjective conﬁdence bands).
7Some data points (1985Q1 and 1986Q1) for the 4-quarter horizon are likely to be wrong (see Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2000)). They are therefore excluded from the estimations.
13Clearly, this result refers to GDP growth—not consumption. However, it is likely to
carry over to consumption since output and consumption are so strongly related (both
theoretically and empirically).
To sum up, this evidence suggests that the consumption growth volatility might be
around 0.6 times the historical volatility. This will, in itself, increase the required risk
aversion (γ) in asset pricing equation (2) by two thirds (that is, scale it up by 5/3).
3.4 Evidence from Options: Stock Return Volatility
There is only very little survey evidence on the return volatility, but implied volatilities
from option prices provide an (imperfect) alternative.
In the Black-Scholes model, an option price depends directly on the market’s belief
about the return volatility until expiration of the option. It is straightforward to calculate
this “implied volatility” from the Black-Scholes formula—and to compare with the ex
post (“realized”) return volatility over the same horizon. This is basically what I am
doing in this section.
The option data (daily 1985 and onwards) contain information on call and put options
on the S&P 500 index, for various strike prices and maturities. I use only those obser-
vations for which there was trade, to avoid using non-informative price quotes. For each
option, I calculate the implied volatility, and then form an average of the two call options
and the two put options with strike prices closest to the futures price. This is a well estab-
lished approach (similar to the Bloomberg approach and also the old VIX), and one that
Ederington and Guan (2002) found to be close to optimal in a forecasting sense.
The reason for averaging calls and puts is that their implied volatilities are likely
to have negatively correlated measurement errors (due to, for instance, nonsynchronous
data)—and the reason for using options that are close to “at the money” is that they are
heavily traded so the prices are informative. To get results for four different ﬁxed horizons
(1 to 4 quarters), I interpolate between maturities.
Table 3 reports results for four horizons (1 to 4 quarters). This evidence suggests that
investors have overestimated volatility by around 15%. Tests of differences (correcting
for overlapping forecasting periods and using a delta method approach) show that the
overestimation is clearly signiﬁcant at a 5% level.
This results can be criticised for being based on a faulty option pricing model which
assumes that volatility is non-random (and asset returns are normally distributed). I will
144 quarters 3 quarters 2 quarters 1 quarter
Options 19.8 19.7 19.3 19.2
Ex post 16.8 16.7 16.7 16.6
Table 3: Standard deviation of S&P 500 returns, annualised %. The table shows results for four
different forecasting horizons. The results for options are implied volatilities calculated from options on
the S&P 500 index (daily data 1985–2005). The ex post volatility is estimated from daily S&P 500 returns.
The standard deviations are calculated as the square root of the time averages of the variances.
discuss two extensions.
First, in a stochastic volatility model like that of Hull and White (1987) where the
stochastic volatility does not imply an additional risk premium (because the asset price
andvolatilityareuncorrelated), thedistributionbecomesnon-normalsotheBlack-Scholes
formula does not apply. A Ball and Roma (1994) approximation then shows that we
should add around 0.5 to the implied volatilities in Table 3, so the overestimation be-
comes even worse.
Second, in a model like that of Heston (1993), the stochastic volatility gives an addi-
tional risk premium. Even if we could approximate the variance as before, this would only
be the variance of the riskneutral distribution. In this case, it is possible that the “overesti-
mation” in Table 3 is just risk premia. This is essentially an open issue (see, for instance,
Jackwerth (2000) for a discussion about “overpriced” options). Without survey data we
rally cannot tell. However, Figure 3 shows an interesting pattern. For clarity, it plots only
the non-overlapping data points for the 2-quarter horizon. The “overestimation” is fairly
persistent, but it seems to be related to the level of uncertainty (measured by either of the
series): more overestimation at low uncertainty. This makes the interpretation in terms of
risk premia a bit counter-intuitive, since the periods of low uncertainty also have fairly
stable uncertainty. Instead, this could be systematic expectations errors.
Together this evidence suggest that the return volatility might perhaps be around 1.15
times the historical volatility, but only if the risk premium for stochastic volatility is not
too important.















ex post (shifted back)
Figure3: Standarddeviationof theS&P500index, annualised%. Thisﬁgureimpliedvolatilities
(from options) and the ex post voaltility of the S&P 500 index, for the 6-month horizon. The ex post
volatility is shifted 6 months back in time to allow for a direct comparison between the forecast (implied
volatility from the options) and the outcome.
4 Implications for the Equity Premium
The results from survey and option data suggest that the historical mean excess returns
should be scaled by 0.5, the standard deviation of excess returns by 1.15 (if we choose to
disregard risk premia for stochastic volatility), and the standard deviation of consumption
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0.6×0.01
γ. (4)
This means that the left hand side is scaled by 0.5 and the right hand side by 0.7—so the
equation would hold for a lower value (factor 0.7) of the relative risk aversion, γ. For
instance, with a perfect correlation we need γ = 30 (instead of 43 in ex post data) to
make this equation hold. This is a step in the right direction—although not a very large
one.
165 Summary
This paper performs a traditional analysis of the equity premium puzzle—but without ex
post data. Instead, data from surveys and options are used.
It is found that survey data on equity returns (from the Livingston survey) show much
lower expected excess returns than in ex post data for the same period: around 3% instead
of around 6%. At the same time, option data indicate that investors might overestimate
the standard deviation of equity returns by a factor 1.15. Both these factors work in favour
of the standard consumption-based asset pricing model.
Unfortunately(forthemodel), dataonsubjectivebeliefsaboutoutputgrowthvolatility
(Survey of Professional Forecasters) shows a marked overconﬁdence—the standard devi-
ation implied by the survey data is just 0.6 of the historical standard deviation. Although
no direct evidence on consumption volatility exists, it is likely to look similar.
Putting these results together leads to some improvement of the consumption based
model. Using survey and option data, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion need only
be 0.7 of what ex post data requires.
A Data Appendix
The data of the Livingston Survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters are from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (http://www.phil.frb.org/). For details, see Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2005) and Croushore (1993).
The daily S&P 500 and S&P 100 price indices are from Datastream. The option data
is from CBOE.
The monthly S&P 500 and S&P Industrials price indices are from S&P’s Trade and
Securities Statistics (1976) and Compustat. The dividends on the S&P 500 is from Shiller
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Eshiller/data.htm), see Shiller (2000). For a discussion of
the historical S&P series, see Jones and Wilson (2002).
The 3-month T-bill rate is from FRED II (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
Quarterly growth of real consumption per capita of nondurables and services is calcu-
latedfromtheseasonallyadjustednumberintheNIPAtables(availableathttp://www.bea.doc.gov/).
The growth rate is calculated as a weighted average of the growth rate of nondurables and
the growth rate of services (chained 2000 dollars), where the (time-varying) weight is the
17relative (current dollar) size of nondurables in relation to services.
Real returns are calculated by dividing the nominal gross return by the gross inﬂation
rate over the same period. Inﬂation is calculated from the seasonally adjusted CPI for all
urban consumers (available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
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